


LITERATURE



AND

PSYCHOLOGY

VOLUME XI

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1961

Denn das Schöne ist nichts
als des Schrecklichen Anfang, den wir noch gerade ertragen,
und wir bewundern es so, weil es gelassen verschmäh't,
uns zu zerstören.

— Rainer Maria Rilke
Duino Elegien, "Die erste Elegie"
[Suggested by J. G. H.]

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
THE QUARTERLY NEWS LETTER
General Topics 10

MODERN LANGUAGE ASSOCIATION

Editorial address:

Department of English
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New York 31, N. Y.

Leonard F. Manheim, Editor
Eleanor B. Manheim, Associate



LITERATURE AND PSYCHOLOGY

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Leonard F. Manheim, Publisher & Editor
Eleanor B. Manheim, Associate Editor

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Being the twelfth annual meeting of an MLA group or conference devoted to the relationship between literature and depth psychology.

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Devoted to a consideration of the treatment of literary criticism as informed by depth psychology in other scholarly journals.

"Men of a Smaller Growth": A Psychological Analysis of William Golding's Lord of the Flies," by Claire Rosenfield 93

It is remarkable that more studies have not appeared on Mr. Golding's works, which seemed to be destined for much scholarly discussion. We are happy to include one of the first of these discussions in this issue and on the program of our 1961 meeting. Dr. Rosenfield, with a B. A. from Smith, went through her baptism of fire as a freshman composition teacher at Harvard while she was completing her doctorate at Radcliffe. After that she taught at the University of Texas and is now teaching at Rutgers.

"Deeper Chaos and Larger Order: Psychoanalysis Confronting Art," by James G. Hepburn. 101

When we welcomed Professor Hepburn to our pages in our first 1959 issue, we expressed the hope that we would hear much from him in the future. We welcome him back and venture to predict that his contribution to the theory of psychoanalytic criticism, sometimes startling, always stimulating, will be the point of departure for discussions which will last not only long into the afternoon and evening of December 28th, but will reverberate through these pages for some time thereafter.

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We hope that our subscribers have found our Ten-Year Index useful, for it cost so much time and money to prepare that our issues have been delayed and have had to be somewhat curtailed as an economy measure. The result: no space in this issue again for more than a listing of books received and a few items from current journals.

p r o g r a m
for the
FOURTH ANNUAL MEETING
of

DISCUSSION GROUP GENERAL TOPICS 10

To be held at the Meeting of the Modern Language Association of America, on Thursday, 28 December 1961, from 10:45 a. m. to noon in the Crystal Room of the Palmer House, Chicago, Illinois.

I. Business Meeting [5 minutes]

1. Report of the Advisory and Nominating Committee.
2. Election of officers and committees for 1962.
3. Other business, if any.

II. Presentation of Papers [40 minutes]

1. 'MEN OF A SMALLER GROWTH': A PSYCHOLOGICAL ANALYSIS OF WILLIAM GOLDING'S LORD OF THE FLIES
BY CLAIRE ROSENFELD (English), Rutgers University.
2. DEEPER CHAOS AND LARGER ORDER:
PSYCHOANALYSIS CONFRONTING ART
BY JAMES G. HEPBURN (English), University of Rhode Island.

III. Discussion, led by WILLIAM WASSERSTROM (English), Syracuse University, will be devoted solely to the papers presented.

OFFICERS FOR 1961

Chairman: Helmut E. Gerber, Purdue University.

Secretary: Louis Fraiberg, Louisiana State University at New Orleans.

Editorial and Program Committee: Leonard F. Manheim, Editor, Eleanor B. Manheim, Associate Editor; Louis Fraiberg, Helmut E. Gerber, William Wasserstrom.

Advisory and Nominating Committee: William J. Griffin (1961-63), chairman; Wayne Burns (1959-61); Leonard F. Manheim (1960-62); Joan E. Corbett, Harry Bergholz, Leon Edel (1961-63).

NOMINEES FOR 1962

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For secretary: William Wasserstrom, Syracuse University.

To the Editorial and Program Committee: Gordon Ross Smith, Pennsylvania State University.

To the Advisory and Nominating Committee: Helmut E. Gerber (1962-64), chairman for 1962.

[The meeting will be followed by an informal luncheon. Those interested will please meet at the door of the Crystal Room.]

NOTES AND COMMENTS

* * Literary Criticism (Un)informed by Depth Psychology

Readers of recent installments of our running bibliographies may have noticed the absence thereof of references to PMLA. The omission has not been wholly due to the exigencies of time and space. We have intentionally refrained from referring to sins of omission and commission in dealing with matters which require — or should require — something more than a nodding acquaintance with psychodynamics. Respect for our "parent" journal, however, cannot permit us to pass unnoticed the recent and most flagrant of these offenses, the publication (in LXXVI, 4, Part 1, 397-406) of the paper most appropriately entitled "A Misreading of Poe's 'Ligeia'." We shall leave to the interested and expert authorities the specific shortcomings of this paper; the policy of the journal which published it certainly requires re-examination. That editorial policy has been very recently re-stated:

We affirm that PMLA exists to encourage the advancement of literary and linguistic learning on the widest possible front. It welcomes new approaches to literary or linguistic study which are based upon sound scholarship, and it disavows any exclusive preference for conventional methods or for traditional papers on traditional subjects. Explicitly it invites important articles dealing with critical theory, . . . provided only that these articles have literary relevance.

* * * * *

Every paper submitted will be read by at least one consultant with special competence in the field of study. Papers in any way recommended will also be read by at least one member of the Editorial Committee.

(PMLA, LXXVI, 5, [624])

Any contributor knows that the "consultants with special competence" rigorously call attention to any scholarly lapse in their special field of competence. The Editorial Committee includes at least two scholars (Professors Davis and Hoffman) who have a just claim to be considered experts in criticism involving depth psychology. But do any of these readers call attention to the gross blunders and glaring omissions in psychodynamic interpretation? It seems hardly possible that any of them do. Awareness of and irritation at this shortcoming is not limited to the present writer; an exasperated correspondent has expressed himself in even stronger language:

. . . PMLA editors are letting slip by, or permitting deliberately, authors' statements which demonstrate ignorance or willful misrepresentation of psychoanalytic theory, which the editors should undertake to eliminate, just as they do eliminate errors and misrepresentations in other fields of scholarship, in order to maintain the status of PMLA as a publication devoted to accurate scholarship even though recognizing the necessity of divergent opinion and interpretation.

We are aware that such statements should be documented by specific references to chapter and verse, but time and space do not permit us to do that in the present issue. We shall devote a large part of the running bibliography in our next issue to specific consideration of some papers published during the last five years in PMLA and, perhaps, in some other scholarly journals as well.

"MEN OF A SMALLER GROWTH":
A PSYCHOLOGICAL ANALYSIS OF WILLIAM GOLDING'S LORD OF THE FLIES

When an author consciously dramatizes Freudian theory — and dramatizes it successfully — only the imaginative re-creation of human behavior rather than the sustaining structure of ideas is apparent. In analyzing William Golding's Lord of the Flies, the critic must assume that Golding knows psychological literature and must then attempt to show how an author's knowledge of theory can vitalize his prose and characterization. The plot itself is uncomplicated, so simple, indeed, that one wonders how it so effortlessly absorbs the burden of meaning. During some unexplained man-made holocaust a plane, evacuating a group of children, crashes on the shore of a tropical island. All adults are conveniently killed. The narrative follows the children's gradual return to the amorality of childhood, and it is the very nature of that state of non-innocence which makes them small savages. Or we might make the analogy to the childhood of races and compare the child to the primitive. Denied the sustaining and repressing authority of parents, church, and state, they form a new culture the development of which reflects that of the genuine primitive society, evolving its gods and demons (its myths), its rituals and taboos (its social norms). On the level of pure narrative, the action proceeds from the gradual struggle between Ralph and Jack, the two oldest boys, for precedence. Ralph is the natural leader by virtue of his superior height, his superior strength, his superior beauty. His mild expression proclaims him "no devil." He possesses the symbol of authority, the conch, or sea shell, which the children use to assemble their miniature councils. Golding writes, "The being that had blown . . . [the conch] had sat waiting for them on the platform with the delicate thing balanced on his knees, was set apart." Jack, on the other hand, is described in completely antithetical terms; he is distinguished by his ugliness and his red hair, a traditional demonic attribute. He first appears as the leader of a church choir, which "creature-like" marches in two columns behind him. All members of the choir wear black; "their bodies, from throat to ankle, were hidden by black cloaks." /1 Ralph initially blows the conch to discover how many children have escaped death in the plane crash. As Jack approaches with his choir from the "darkness of the forest," he cannot see Ralph, whose back is to the sun. The former is, symbolically, sun-blinded. These two are very obviously intended to recall God and the Devil, whose confrontation, in the history of Western religions, establishes the moral basis for all actions. But, as Freud reminds us, "metaphysics" becomes "metapsychology" /2; gods and devils are "nothing other than psychological processes projected into the outer world." /3 If Ralph is a projection of man's good impulses from which we derive the authority figures — whether god, king, or father — who establish the necessity for our valid ethical and social action, then Jack becomes an externalization of the evil instinctual forces of the unconscious. Originally, as in the more primitive religions, gods and devils were one; even Hebraic-Christian tradition makes Satan a fallen angel.

The temptation is to regard the island on which the children are marooned as a kind of Eden, uncorrupted and Eveless. But the actions of the children negate any assumption about childhood innocence. Even though Golding himself momentarily becomes a victim of his Western culture and states that Ralph wept for the "end of innocence," events have simply supported Freud's conclusions that no child is innocent. On a third level, Ralph is every man — or every child — and his body becomes the battleground where reason and instinct struggle, each to assert itself. For to regard Ralph and Jack as Good and Evil is to ignore the role of the child Piggy, who in the child's world of make-believe is the outsider. Piggy's composite description not only manifests his dif-

ference from the other boys; it also reminds the reader of the stereotype image of the old man who has more-than-human wisdom: he is fat, inactive because asthmatic, and generally reveals a disinclination for physical labor. Because he is extremely near-sighted, he wears thick glasses—a further mark of his difference. As time passes, the hair of the other boys grows with abandon. "He was the only boy on the island whose hair never seemed to grow. The rest were shock-headed, but Piggy's hair still lay in wisps over his head as though baldness were his natural state, and this imperfect covering would soon go, like the velvet on a young stag's antlers" (81). In these images of age and authority we have a figure reminiscent of the children's past—the father. Moreover, like the father he counsels common sense; he alone leavens with a reasonable gravity the constant exuberance of the others for play or for play at hunting. When they scamper off at every vague whim, he scornfully comments, "Like a pack of kids." Ungrammatically but logically, he tries to allay the "littluns" fear of a "beast." "Life is scientific, that's what it is. . . . I know there isn't no beast—not with claws and all that, I mean—but I know there isn't no fear, either" (105). He has excessive regard for the forms of order: the conch must be held by a child before that child can speak at councils. When the others neglect responsibility, fail to build shelters, swim in the pools or play in the sand or hunt, allow the signal fire on the mountain to go out or to get out of hand and burn up half the island, he seconds Ralph by admonishing the others vigorously and becomes more and more of a spoil-sport who robs play of its illusions, the adult interrupting the game. Ralph alone recognizes his superior intelligence but wavers between what he knows to be wise and the group acceptance his egocentricity demands. Finally, Piggy's role—as man's reasoning faculties and as a father—derives some of its complexity from the fact that the fire which the children foster and guard on the mountain in the hope of communicating with the adult world is lighted with his glasses. In mythology, after all, the theft of fire brought civilization—and, hence, repression—to man. As the new community becomes more and more irrational, its irrationality is marked by Piggy's progressive blindness. An accident following an argument between Ralph and Jack breaks one of the lenses. When the final breach between the two occurs and Piggy supports Ralph, his remaining lens is stolen in a night raid by Jack. This is a parody of the traditional fire theft, which was to provide light and warmth for mankind. After this event Piggy must be led by Ralph. When he is making his final plea for his glasses—reasoned as always—he is struck on the head by a rock and falls. "Piggy fell forty feet and landed on his back on that square, red rock in the sea. His head opened and stuff came out and turned red. Piggy's arms and legs twitched a bit, like a pig's after it has been killed" (223).

The history of the child Piggy on the island dramatizes in terms of the individual the history of the entire group. When they first assemble to investigate their plight, they treat their island isolation as a temporary phenomenon; they want to play games until they are rescued—until their parents reassert the repressive actions of authority. This microcosm of the great world seems to them to be a fairy land.

A kind of glamour spread over them and the scene and they were conscious of the glamour and made happy by it (33).

The coral was scribbled in the sea as though a giant had bent down to reproduce the shape of the island in a flowing, chalk line but tired before he had finished (38).

"This is real exploring," said Jack. "I'll bet nobody's been here before" (35).

Echoes and birds flew, white and pink dust floated, the forest further down shook as with the passage of an enraged monster: and then the island was still (37).

They compare this reality to their reading experiences: it is Treasure Island or Coral Island or like pictures from their travel books. This initial reaction conforms to the pattern of play which Johan Huizinga establishes in Homo Ludens. /4 In its early stages their play has no cultural or moral function; it is simply a "stepping out of real life into a temporary sphere of activity." /5 Ironically, the child of Lord of the Flies who thinks he is "only pretending" or that this is "only for fun" does not realize that his play is the beginning of the formation of a new society which has regressed to a primitive state, with all its emphasis upon taboo and communal action. What begins by being like other games in having a distinct "locality and duration" /6 apart from ordinary life is — or becomes — reality. The spatial separation necessary for the make-believe of the game is represented first by the island. In this new world the playground is further narrowed: the gatherings of the children are described as a circle at several points, a circle from which Piggy is excluded:

For the moment the boys were a closed circuit of sympathy with Piggy outside (29).

They became a circle of boys round a camp fire and even Ralph and Piggy were half-drawn in (92).

Piggy approximates the spoil-sport who "robs the play of its illusion." /7

The games of the beginning have a double function: they, first of all, reflect the child's attitude toward play as a temporary cessation from the activities imposed by the adult world; but like the games played before the formation of civilization, they anticipate the ritual which reveals a developing society. So the children move from voluntary play to ritual, from "only pretending" to reality, from representation to identification. The older strictures imposed by parents are soon forgotten — but every now and then a momentary remembrance of past prohibitions causes restraint. One older child hides in order to throw stones at a younger one.

Yet there was a space round Henry, perhaps six yards in diameter, into which he dare not throw. Here, invisible yet strong, was the taboo of the old life. Round the squatting child was the protection of parents and school and policemen and the law (78).

Jack hesitates when, searching for meat, he raises his knife to kill his first pig.

The pause was only long enough for them to understand what an enormity the downward stroke would be. Then the piglet tore loose from the creepers and scurried into the undergrowth. . . .

"Why didn't you — ?"

They knew very well why he hadn't: because of the enormity of the knife descending and cutting into living flesh; because of the unbearable blood (40-41).

The younger children first, then gradually the older ones, like primitives in the childhood of races, begin to people the darkness of night and forest with spirits and demons which had previously appeared only in their dreams or fairy tales. Now there are no comforting mothers to dispel the terrors of the unknown. They externalize these fears into the figure of a "beast." Once the word "beast" is mentioned, the menace of the irrational becomes overt; name and thing become one. At one critical council when the first communal feeling begins to disintegrate, Ralph cries, "'If only they could send us something grown-up . . . a sign or something'" (117). And a sign does come from the outside.

That night, unknown to the children, a plane is shot down and its pilot parachutes dead to earth and is caught in the rocks on the mountain. It requires no more than the darkness of night together with the shadows of the forest vibrating in the signal fire to distort the hanging corpse with its expanding silk 'chute into a demon that must be appeased. Ironically, the fire of communication does touch this object of the grown-up world only to foster superstition. Security in this new situation can be achieved only by establishing new rules.

During the first days the children, led by Jack, play at hunting. But eventually the circle of the playground extends to the circle of the hunted and squealing pig seeking refuge—and it is significant that the first animal slain for food is a nursing sow—which itself anticipates the circle of consecrated ground where the children perform the new rites of the kill.

The first hunt accomplishes its purpose: the blood of the animals is spilled; the meat, used for food. But because Jack and his choir undertake this hunt, they desert the signal fire, which is dictated by the common-sense desire for rescue, and it goes out and a ship passes the island. Later the children reenact the killing with one boy, Maurice, assuming the role of the pig running its frenzied circle. The others chant in unison: "Kill the pig. Cut her throat. Bash her in." At this dramatic representation each child is still aware that this is a display, a performance. He is never "so beside himself that he loses consciousness of ordinary reality." /8 Each time they reenact the same event, however, their behavior becomes more frenzied, more cruel, less like representation than identification. The chant then becomes, "Kill the beast. Cut his throat. Spill his blood." It is as if the first event, the pig's death, is forgotten in the recesses of time; a new myth defines the primal act. Real pig becomes mythical beast.

Jack's ascendancy over the group begins when the children's fears distort the natural objects around them: twigs become creepers, shadows become demons. I have already discussed the visual imagery suggesting Jack's demonic function. He serves as a physical manifestation of irrational forces. After an indefinite passage of time, he appears almost dehumanized, his "nose only a few inches from the humid earth." He is "dog-like" and proceeds forward "on all fours" "into the semi-darkness of the undergrowth." His cloak and clothing have been shed. Indeed, except for a "pair of tattered shorts held up by his knife-belt, he was naked." His eyes seemed "bolting and nearly mad." He has lost his ability to communicate with Ralph as on the first day. "He tried to convey the compulsion to track down and kill that was swallowing him up" (65). "They walked along, two continents of experience and feeling, unable to communicate" (70). When Jack first explains to Ralph the necessity to disguise himself from the pigs he wants to hunt, he rubs his face with clay and charcoal. At this point he assumes a mask, begins to dance, is finally freed from all the repressions of his past. "He capered towards Bill, and the mask was a thing on its own, behind which Jack hid, liberated from shame and self-consciousness" (80). At the moment of the dance the mask and Jack are one. The first kill, as I have noted, follows the desertion of the signal fire and the passage of a possible rescue ship. Jack is still revelling in the knowledge that he has "outwitted a living thing, imposed their will upon it, taken away its life like a long and satisfying drink" (88). Already he has begun to obliterate the distinctions between animals and men, as do primitives; already he thinks in terms of the metaphor of a ritual drinking of blood, the efficacy of which depended on the drinker's assumption of his victim's strength and spirit. Ralph and Piggy confront him with his defection of duty.

The two boys faced each other. There was the brilliant world of hunting, tactics, fierce exhilaration, skill; and there was the world of longing and baffled common-

sense. Jack transferred the knife to his left hand and smudged blood over his forehead as he pushed down the plastered hair (89).

Jack's unconscious gesture is a parody of the ritual of initiation in which the hunter's face is smeared with the blood of his first kill. In the subsequent struggle one of the lenses of Piggy's spectacles is broken. The dominance of reason is over; the voice of the old world is stilled. The primary images are no longer those of fire and light but those of darkness and blood. The link between Ralph and Jack "had snapped and fastened elsewhere."

The rest of the group, however, shifts its allegiance to Jack because he has given them meat rather than something useless like fire. Gradually, they begin to be described as "shadows" or "masks" or "savages" or "demoniac figures" and, like Jack, "hunt naked save for paint and a belt." Ralph now uses Jack's name with the recognition that "a taboo was evolving around that word too." Name and thing again become one; to use the word is to incite the bearer. But more significant, the taboo, according to Freud, is "a very primitive prohibition imposed from without (by an authority) and directed against the strongest desires of man." /9 In this new society it replaces the authority of the parents. Now every kill becomes a sexual act, is a metaphor for childhood sexuality.

The afternoon wore on, hazy and dreadful with damp heat; the sow staggered her way ahead of them, bleeding and mad, and the hunters followed, wedded to her in lust, excited by the long chase and dropped blood. . . . The sow collapsed under them and they were heavy and full-filled upon her (167-168).

Every subsequent "need for ritual" fulfills not only the desire for communication and a substitute security to replace that of civilization, but also the need to liberate both the repressions of the past and those imposed by Ralph. Indeed, the projection of those impulses that they cannot accept in themselves into a beast is the beginning of a new mythology. The earlier dreams and nightmares can now be shared as the former subjectivity could not be.

When the imaginary demons become defined by the rotting corpse and floating 'chute on the mountain which their terror distorts into a beast, Jack wants to track the creature down. After the next kill, the head of the pig is placed upon a stake to placate it. Finally one of the children, Simon, after an epileptic fit, creeps out of the forest at twilight while the others are engaged in enthusiastic dancing following a hunt. Seized by the rapture of reenactment or perhaps terrorized by fear and night into believing that this little creature is a beast, they circle Simon, pounce on him, bite and tear his body to death. He becomes not a substitute for beast but beast itself; representation becomes absolute identification, "the mystic repetition of the initial event." /10 At the moment of Simon's death, nature speaks; a cloud bursts; rain and wind fill the parachute on the hill and the corpse of the pilot falls or is dragged among the screaming boys. Both Simon and the dead man, beast and beast, are washed into the sea and disappear. After this complete resurgence of savagery in accepted ritual, there is only a short interval before Piggy's remaining lens is stolen, he is intentionally killed as an enemy, and Ralph, the human being, becomes hunted like beast or pig.

Simon's mythic and psychological role has earlier been suggested. Undersized, subject to epileptic fits, bright-eyed, and introverted, he constantly creeps away from the others to meditate among the intricate vines of the forest. To him, as to the mystic, superior knowledge is given intuitively which he cannot communicate. When the first report of the beast-pilot reaches camp,

Simon, we are told, can picture only "a human at once heroic and sick." During the day preceding his death, he walks vaguely away and stumbles upon the pig's head left in the sand in order to appease the demonic forces they imagine. Shaman-like, he holds a silent colloquy with it, a severed head covered with innumerable flies. It is itself the titled Lord of the Flies, a name applied to the Biblical demon Beelzebub and later used in Goethe's *Faust*, Part I, to describe Mephistopheles. /11 From it he learns that it is the Beast, and the Beast cannot be hunted because it is within. Simon feels the advent of one of his fits and imagines the head expanding, an anticipation or intuition of the discovery of the pilot's corpse. Suddenly Golding employs a startling image, "Simon was inside the mouth. He fell down and lost consciousness" (178). Literally, this image presents the hallucination of a sensitive child about to lose control of his rational faculties. Metaphorically, it suggests the ritual quest in which the hero is swallowed by a serpent or dragon or beast whose belly is the underworld, undergoes a symbolic death in order to gain the elixir to revitalize his stricken society, and returns with his knowledge to the timed world as a redeemer. Psychologically, this narrative pattern is a figure of speech connoting the annihilation of the ego, an internal journey necessary for self-understanding, a return to the timelessness of the unconscious. When Simon wakes, he realizes that he must confront the beast on the mountain because "what else is there to do?" He is relieved of "that dreadful feeling of the pressure of personality" which had oppressed him earlier. When he discovers the hanging corpse, he first frees it in compassion although it is rotting and surrounded by flies, and then staggers unevenly down to report to the others. Redeemer and scapegoat, he becomes the victim of the group he seeks to enlighten. In death—before he is pulled into the sea—his head is surrounded by flies in an ironic parody of the halo of saints and gods.

Piggy's death, soon to follow Simon's, is foreshadowed when the former proclaims at council that there is no beast. "'What would a beast eat?'" "'Pig.'" "'We eat pig,'" he rationally answers. "'Piggy!'" (104) is the next word. At Piggy's death his body twitches "like a pig's after it has been killed." Not only has his head been smashed, but also the conch, symbol of order, is simultaneously broken. A complex group of metaphors unite to form a total metaphor involving Piggy and the pig, hunted and eaten by the children, and the pig's head which is at once left to appease the beast's hunger and is the beast itself. But the beast is within, and the children are defined by the very objects they seek to destroy.

In these associated images we have the whole idea of a communal and sacrificial feast and a symbolic cannibalism, all of which Freud discussed in *Totem and Taboo*. Here the psychology of the individual contributes the configurations for the development of religion. Indeed, the events of *Lord of the Flies* imaginatively parallel the patterns which Freud detects in primitive mental processes.

Having populated the outside world with demons and spirits which are projections of their instinctual nature, these children—and primitive men—must then unconsciously evolve new forms of worship and laws, which manifest themselves in taboos, the oldest form of social repression. With the exception of the first kill—in which the children still imagine they are playing at hunting—the subsequent deaths assume a ritual form; the pig is eaten communally by all and the head is left for the "beast," whose role consists in sharing the feast. This is much like the "public ceremony" /12 described by Freud in which the sacrifice of an animal provided food for the god and his worshippers. The complex relationships within the novel between the "beast," the pigs which are sacrificed, the children whose asocial impulses are externalized in the beast—this has already been discussed. So we see that, as Freud points out, the "sacrificing community,

its god [the 'beast'], and the sacrificial animal are of the same blood" /13, members of a clan. The pig, then, may be regarded as a totem animal, an "ancestor, a tutelary spirit and protector"; /14 it is, in any case, a part of every child. The taboo or prohibition against eating particular parts of the totem animal coincides with the children's failure to eat the head of the pig. It is that portion which is set aside for the "beast." Just as Freud describes the primitive feast, so the children's festive meal is accompanied by a frenzied ritual in which they temporarily release their forbidden impulses and represent the kill. To consume the pig and to reenact the event is not only to assert a "common identity" /15 but also to share a "common responsibility" for the deed. None of the boys is excluded from the feast. The later ritual, in which Simon, as a human substitute identified with the totem, is killed, is in this novel less an unconscious attempt to share the responsibility for the killing of a primal father in prehistoric times, than it is a social act in which the participants celebrate their new society by commemorating their severance from the authority of the civilized state. Because of the juxtaposition of Piggy and pig, the eating of pig at the communal feast might be regarded as the symbolic cannibalism by which the children physically partake of the qualities of the slain and share responsibility for their crime. (It must be remembered that, although Piggy on a symbolic level represents the light of reason and the authority of the father, on the psychological and literal level of the story he shares that bestiality and irrationality which to Golding dominate all men, even the most rational or civilized.)

In the final action, Ralph is outlawed by the children and hunted like an animal. Jack sharpens a stick at both ends so that it will be ready to receive the severed head of the boy as if he were a pig. Jack keeps his society together because it, like the brother horde of Robertson Smith /16 and Freud, "is based on complicity in the common crimes." /17 In his flight Ralph, seeing the grinning skull of a pig, thinks of it as a toy and remembers the early days on the island when all were united in play. In the play world, the world of day, he has become a "spoil-sport" like Piggy; in the world based upon primitive rites and taboos, the night world where fears become demons and sleep is like death, he is the heretic or outcast. This final hunt, after the conch is broken, is the pursuit of the figure representing law and order, the king or the god. Finally, Jack, through misuse of the dead Piggy's glasses, accidentally sets the island on fire. A passing cruiser, seeing the fire, lands to find only a dirty group of sobbing little boys. "'Fun and games,' said the officer. . . . 'What have you been doing? Having a war or something?'" (246-47).

But are all the meanings of the novel as clear as they seem? To restrict it to an imaginative re-creation of Freud's theory that children are little savages, that no child is innocent whatever Christian theology would have us believe, is to limit its significance for the adult world. To say that the "beasts" we fear are within, that man is essentially irrational — or, to place a moral judgment on the irrational, that man is evil — that, again, is too easy. In this forced isolation of a group of children, Golding is making a statement about the world they have left — a world, we are told, "in ruins." According to Huizinga's theory of play, war is a game, a contest for prestige which, like the games of primitives or of classical athletes, may be fatal. It, too, has its rules, although the modern concept of total war tends to obscure both its ritualistic and its ennobling character. It, too, has its spatial and temporal limitations, as the new rash of "limited" wars makes very clear. More than once the children's acts are compared to those of the outside world. When Jack first blackens his face like a savage, he gives his explanation: "'For hunting. Like in war. You know — dazzle paint. Like things trying to look like something else'" (79). Appalled by one of the ritual dances, Piggy and Ralph discuss the authority and ration-

ality of the apparently secure world they have left:

"Grown-ups know things," said Piggy. "They ain't afraid of the dark. They'd meet and have tea and discuss. Then things 'ud be all right —"

"They wouldn't set fire to the island. Or lose —"

"They'd build a ship —"

The three boys stood in the darkness, striving unsuccessfully to convey the majesty of adult life.

"They wouldn't quarrel —"

"Or break my specs —"

"Or talk about a beast —"

"If only they could get a message to us," cried Ralph desperately. "If only they could send us some thing grown-up . . . a sign or something" (117).

The sign does come that night, unknown to them, in the form of the parachute and its attached corpse. The pilot in the analogue in the adult world to the ritual killing of the child Simon on the island; he, like Simon, is the victim and scapegoat of his society, which has unleashed its instincts in war. Both he and Simon are associated by a cluster of visual images. Both are identified with beasts by the children, who do see the truth — that all men are bestial — but do not understand it. Both he and Simon attract the flies from the Lord of the Flies, the pig's head symbolic of the demonic; both he and Simon are washed away by a cleansing but not reviving sea. His position on the mountain recalls the Hanged or Sacrificed god of Frazer; here, however, we have a parody of fertility. He is dead proof that Piggy's exaggerated respect for adults is itself irrational. When the officer at the rescue jokingly says, "What have you been doing? Having a war or something?" this representative of the grown-up world does not understand that the games of the children, which result in two deaths, are a moral commentary upon the primitive nature of his own culture. The ultimate irrationality is war. Paradoxically, the children not only return to a primitive and infantile morality, but they also degenerate into adults. They prove that, indeed, "children are but men of a smaller growth."

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notes

1/ William Golding, Lord of the Flies (London, 1958), p. 25. Subsequent references to this work will be noted parenthetically by page numbers in the text.

2/ Sigmund Freud, The Psychopathology of Everyday Life, as quoted by Ernest Jones, The Life and Work of Sigmund Freud (New York, 1957), III, 53.

3/ Ibid.

4/ Johan Huizinga, Homo Ludens (Boston, 1955).

5/ Ibid., p. 8.

6/ Ibid., p. 9.

7/ Ibid., p. 7.

8/ Ibid., p. 14.

9/ Sigmund Freud, "Totem and Taboo," in The Basic Writings of Sigmund Freud, trans. A. A. Brill (New York, 1938), p. 834.

10/ Ibid., p. 834.

11/ Ibid.

- 12/ There are further affinities to Sartre's Les Mouches.
 13/ Totem and Taboo, p. 878.
 14/ Ibid., p. 808.
 15/ Ibid., p. 914.
 16/ William Robertson Smith, Lectures on the Religion of the Semites, 3rd ed., with introduction by Stanley A. Cook (New York, 1927).
 17/ Totem and Taboo, p. 916.

DEEPER CHAOS AND LARGER ORDER:
 PSYCHOANALYSIS CONFRONTING ART

1

In the literature of psychoanalytical criticism there may be discerned two strains, the romantic and the scientific. Perhaps the most impressive example of the former is "The Moses of Michelangelo." It is a personal essay, describing an encounter with an enigma and the unveiling of it. In the brief introductory section, Freud remarks that some of the great works of art are unsolved riddles. He acknowledges a personal limitation in confronting enigma: "some rationalistic, or perhaps analytic, turn of mind in me rebels against being moved by a thing without knowing why I am thus affected." /1 That most mysterious of the arts, music, he admits to be inaccessible to him. Then, in one of the most astonishing passages that characterize the best of his writing, he describes the power that Michelangelo's statue has exerted over him:

How often have I mounted the steep steps from the unlovely Corso Cavour to the lonely piazza where the deserted church stands, and have essayed to support the angry scorn of the hero's glance! Sometimes I have crept cautiously out of the half-gloom of the interior as though I myself belonged to the mob upon whom his eye is turned — the mob which can hold fast no conviction, which has neither faith nor patience, and which rejoices when it has regained its illusory idols (p. 213).

In Section I of the essay, Freud reviews the earlier analyses of the statue, and he finds that the authorities do not agree on simple matters of physical detail. Are the Tables of the Laws slipping from the right hand of the statue or are they held securely? Is Moses grasping his beard or is he merely passing his hand over it? Nor do the authorities agree on matters of paramount importance. Does Moses display explosive wrath or majestic self-assurance? Is he shown at the moment when he discovers his people worshipping the golden calf or is he shown in a timeless posture? In Section II, Freud begins his own contemplation of the statue, and he realizes that the position of the Tables of the Laws and of Moses' hand upon his beard can be accounted for only by predicating a prior position. That prior position, it becomes evident, must be one of expressed anger. The present position is not one of expressed anger, as Freud himself and most earlier authorities had thought; it is one of suppressed anger. In Section III comes the full revelation. Freud perceives that Michelangelo has created not the wrathful Moses of convention but a Moses who has attained "the highest mental achievement that is possible in a man, that of struggling successfully against an inward passion for the sake of a cause to which he has devoted himself" (p. 233). The mistakes of earlier authorities stem from confused perception of the actual statue that Michelangelo created and the prior position that is implicit in it. /2

The rhetorical form of the essay recapitulates Freud's own discovery of the meaning of the statue. On the fourth day of his first visit to Rome, in the year 1901, he wrote to his wife that he had seen the statue, and added, "Plötzlich durch Mich. verstanden." /3 Ernest Jones translates the phrase loosely: "I have come to understand the meaning of the statue by contemplating Michelangelo's intention." /4 Jones himself adds that Freud could not have come to his final interpretation on this first visit, and supports his view by citing the passage in "The Moses" in which Freud remarks that for a long time he thought that the statue was about to start up in wrath. However, he does not suggest an intermediate interpretation that Freud might have made, and he ignores the possibility that Freud allowed himself some artistic license in the essay. /5 Eleven years passed before Freud was in Rome again to see the statue, and another few months elapsed before he undertook to read the literature dealing with it. Perhaps he did not discover the true meaning of the statue until he had conducted his scholarly investigation. If so, his essay preserves the chronological order of his experience. But rhetorically the essay re-creates the romantic moment that he described to his wife. The introductory remarks express his awe before the statue; the review of the authorities in Section I and his own reflections in Section II express the intellectual puzzlement that the sense of mystery deteriorates into; then in Section III comes the revelation: Plötzlich durch Mich. verstanden.

Such revealed truth is credited today more than it once was. The scientist who was believed to proceed by induction, assembling and adding up his facts until he arrived at the First Law of Thermodynamics or the Uncertainty Principle is now seen as a man who leaps to conclusions. Often the leap is a revelation, and it may be many years before the revelation receives the scrutiny of uninspired analysis. It is tempting to think that Freud suddenly understood the statue of Moses when he first saw it in 1901, but hardly believed what he understood, and subsequently subjected it to the prosaic tests of critical investigation. One reflects that his greatest single work, The Interpretation of Dreams, came not at the end of a long career of scientific investigation but near the beginning, at a time when he was most unscientifically interested in Wilhelm Fliess' numerology. Perhaps the subject, or nature, of psychoanalysis invites revealed truth. Theodor Reik remarks upon its importance in psychoanalytic theory:

If we thrust aside the doubtful communications from the unconscious, as being unreliable, indefinite, and contrary to our conscious judgments and prejudices, we shall, it is true, seldom be deceived, but then we shall seldom attain surprising knowledge. /6

Contrasting to truth attained by revelation is truth attained "scientifically" — that is, truth that follows from known laws. Among Freud's own works, his monograph on Leonardo contrasts in such a way with his study of the statue of Moses. In Part I of the monograph he both propounds and solves the riddle of Leonardo. The riddle is the artist who turned away from art to science and who when he returned to art did not complete his works and showed no concern for their physical permanence. The solution presents itself to the psychoanalyst who understands the laws that govern the behavior of men: "There is only one way in which the peculiarity of . . . [his] emotional life can be understood in connection with . . . [his] double nature as an artist and a scientific investigator." /7 The remainder of the monograph merely confirms and clarifies Freud's diagnosis. In Part II, Freud analyzes the fantasy that Leonardo had recorded as a true experience of his infancy. "While I was in my cradle," Leonardo had written, "a vulture came down to me, and opened my mouth with its tail, and struck me many times with its tail against my lips" (p. 82). The interpretation comes easily: the fantasy is that of the passive homosexual, and also that of the child at its mother's breast. Freud then asks why Leonardo should have chosen the vul-

ture as the instrument of his fantasy, and he turns for his answer to the Egyptian worship of a vulture mother-goddess and to the notion that vultures are exclusively female. He shows that the fantasy signifies Leonardo's identification with his mother, with whom he lived alone during his first years, and that it also signifies his longing for his father.

In such a way the monograph spins itself out. Implicit in every line is the assumption that every properly trained psychoanalyst who was presented with the same evidence would interpret it in the same way and reach the same conclusion that Freud himself reaches. It is, one might say, a model for the scientific analysis that many psychoanalytic critics would like to see advanced in literary studies. And it is unconvincing. In his study of Leonardo, Sir Kenneth Clark observes that most Leonardo scholars have rejected Freud's argument; and although he himself is sympathetic to psychological explanation and does not directly attack Freud, he explains the development of Leonardo's art in cultural and intellectual terms that implicitly clash with the psychoanalytic explanation.^{/8} Perhaps the art historian is to be expected to fail to appreciate the psychoanalytical viewpoint, and Sir Kenneth's admission that Leonardo scholars have rejected Freud's opinions "with horror" (p. 4) suggests reaction rather than reason. But from within the psychoanalytical fold has come other evidence of Freud's failure. In his introductory remarks to the essay in the Standard Edition James Strachey points out that Freud relies upon a faulty translation of Leonardo's Italian. The scientific flight that he undertakes with the vulture should have been undertaken with a kite. Strachey argues that the mistake does not vitiate Freud's central analysis, and it may not; but it does emphasize the frailty of all of Freud's reasoning in the essay. Consider, for example, Freud's use of the fact that Leonardo was once tried on a charge of homosexuality and his assertion that "it is doubtful whether Leonardo ever embraced a woman in passion" (p. 71). Given the scantiness of biographical information on both points (as Freud himself notes, Leonardo was acquitted of the charge of homosexuality), some caution would be in order. But presently Freud is speaking dogmatically of "the atrophy of his sexual life (which was restricted to what is called ideal homosexuality)" (p. 80). He takes the charge of homosexuality to be more significant than the acquittal, and he takes the acquittal to be adequate evidence that Leonardo was not an active homosexual. But if he had been more modest in his argument, he would not have been more convincing; for the important reason that the monograph is unconvincing is that it is scientific. Never for a moment does Freud give his reader the sense of Leonardo the man that he gives him of the statue of Moses. The monograph possesses its own rhetorical excellence, but it is untouched by the sense of revelation that persuades the reader of "The Moses." It is a later work than "The Moses," the product of the scientist who is laying down the laws rather than of the inspired genius who is uncovering them.^{/9}

But if the scientific spirit is to be attacked, the romantic spirit must be attacked as well. "The Moses" needs to be looked at again. Although in the essay Freud no more than alludes to the matter, one of the most interesting problems that he raises is the bearing that one's own psyche has upon the way one sees things. Why did so many nineteenth century authorities see incipient wrath in the statue rather than restrained wrath? Why were some so bemused by their feelings that they described the details of the statue inaccurately? Moses must have seemed like a stern father to them. But Freud himself should not be exempt from the laws of human psychology, and there is evidence aplenty that his reaction to the statue was predetermined. Without questioning the legitimacy of that reaction, Ernest Jones observes that it coincided with the dispute with Jung, a dispute which Freud wished to conclude without destroying the psychoanalytic movement. (Jones is assuming that Freud's final interpretation came in 1912-13

rather than in 1901. "One cannot avoid the pretty obvious conclusion," Jones writes, "that at this time, and probably before, Freud had identified himself with Moses and was striving to emulate the victory over passions that Michelangelo had depicted" (II, 366) — a victory, in Freud's words describing the statue, "for the sake of a cause to which he has devoted himself." One can hardly avoid another conclusion: that Freud attributed to the statue the victory that he himself wanted, not merely a victory in suppressing his anger at Jung (assuming that Jones is right about the date of the interpretation), but a victory such as that which his development of psychoanalytic theory represented in the whole of his psychic life, the submitting of the unconscious to reason. Two pages earlier in his biography Jones remarks that Freud's first feeling that the statue was gazing angrily at him must have reflected feelings about an angry father. Again one is tempted to think that Freud's final interpretation reflected his wish for his father to put away his wrath. Many pages further on, Jones remarks upon a connection between Freud's interest in the historical Moses and his relationship with his younger brother Julius, whose Jewish name may have been Moses. Jones notes Freud's jealousy of his brother, and his feeling of responsibility for his brother's death; and at another point he quotes Freud's remark to a translator of "The Moses" that "my feeling for this piece of work [the statue] is rather like that towards a love-child" (II, 367). One is inclined to believe that Freud's version of the meaning of Michelangelo's statue was compounded of the images he wanted to see in his father, in himself, and in his younger brother. His interpretation was so personal that he published the essay anonymously and did not acknowledge authorship for ten years. /10

Early in his life Freud said, "I always find it uncanny when I can't understand someone in terms of myself" (I, 320); and late in life he wrote the very opposite to Arthur Schnitzler — although it may be the same thing: "I think I have avoided you from a kind of awe of meeting my 'double' Your determinism and your scepticism . . . , and the extent to which your thoughts are preoccupied with the polarity of love and death; all that moves me with an uncanny feeling of familiarity" (III, 443). The uncanniness of that which he cannot interpret in terms of himself and the uncanniness of the person who seems to be his double are, in part, the subject of an essay, "The Uncanny," that he wrote in 1919. He asserts in that essay that the capacity for doubling gives man his powers of self-observation, and that the uncanniness of the double must stem from the fact that it calls to mind "a creation dating back to a very early mental stage . . . , a stage, incidentally, at which it wore a more friendly aspect." /11 Who can doubt that Freud's contemplation of the unsolved riddle of the great work, his awe before it, and his interpretation of its expression constituted an uncanny experience? Who can avoid thinking of Oedipus confronting the Sphinx? Those German words are puzzling: Plötzlich durch Mich. verstanden. What has been understood through Michelangelo? Suddenly through Michelangelo I have understood the statue of Moses? Or suddenly through Michelangelo (through the statue of Michelangelo) I have understood myself? Plötzlich mich verstanden. Plötzlich durch Mich. mich verstanden. When Freud went to Rome for the first time, he was completing the major part of his self-analysis.

ii

If the danger of romantic analysis is that it may have more to do with the author of the analysis than with the object he is discussing, and if the danger of scientific analysis is that it is usually unconvincing and often unscientific, the solution must be to find a proper balance between the two. (Assuredly no piece of analysis is purely one or the other.) Before such a course is recommended, it will be useful to look at the problem from another standpoint. In the opening lines of "The Moses" Freud says:

I am no connoisseur in art, but simply a layman. I have often observed that the subject-matter of works of art has a stronger attraction for me than their formal and technical qualities, though to the artist their value lies first and foremost in these latter. I am unable to appreciate many of the methods used and the effects obtained in art (p. 211).

This becoming modesty does not characterize the main body of the analysis. Within four paragraphs Freud has forgotten that he is a layman, forgotten too that his layman's interest is narrowly limited to subject-matter. He writes: "In my opinion, what grips us so powerfully can only be the artist's intention . . . ; what he aims at is to awaken in us the same emotional attitude, the same mental constellation as that which in him produced the impetus to create" (p. 212). And soon enough he is saying that he will uncover "all that is most essential and valuable for the comprehension of this work of art" (p. 214). This ambivalence of attitude has been hinted at by Ernest Jones in another context. Jones remarks that "Freud always had an immense respect for artists, possibly tinged with some envy. He seemed to take the romantic view of them as mysterious beings . . . but he tried at least to comprehend the source of their inspiration" (II, 344). In discussing the monograph on Leonardo, Jones asserts that Freud probably saw the conflict in Leonardo between artist and scientist to be very much his own conflict. Subsequently he argues that in Freud the passion to get at the truth, the passion of investigation, submerged the artist that he might have been. /12 Assuredly Freud responded to the statue of Moses with his esthetic sensibilities, with more than his announced interest in subject-matter, and then he gave rein to his scientific passion. He was aware of mystery, and then he sought to master it.

But the modesty of the opening of "The Moses" not only suggests a romantic reverence for art; it also expresses something of the scientific attitude itself. The scientist sits down like a child before the unknown; he rises like a master. (If he is a good master, he rises with a gracious gesture. Thus Freud concludes his essay by wondering whether he himself has "shared the fate of so many interpreters who have thought they saw quite clearly things which the artist did not intend either consciously or unconsciously." P. 236.) Such a dual attitude can be seen in most of the psychoanalytic writing on art that is avowedly scientific. In the opening pages of Fiction and the Unconscious, Simon O. Lesser remarks that it is perhaps "not feasible to develop a truly scientific esthetic of response to fiction," but the main body of his discussion offers scientific certitude:

We read fiction to secure richer fulfillment of desires no more than partly satisfied by life and to allay the anxieties and guilt feelings our experience arouses.

The aspects of narrative art we assign to form have three essential functions: to give pleasure, to avoid or relieve guilt or anxiety, and to facilitate perception. /13

In Psychoanalysis and American Literary Criticism, Louis Fraiberg begins his discussion of the views of Ernst Kris by noting Kris' objection to the certitudes of Jung and Rank: "their urge for certainty has blinded them to the complexity of the subject." /14 But Kris' own views have their certitudes:

The tremendous variety of art arises from the (unconscious) secondary revision which softens objections, supplies transitions, finds points of similarity, and in general provides at least a patchwork of temporarily acceptable organization of the fantasy. The way is thus prepared for the artist's deliberate manipulation of the fantasy according to the requirements of his basic idea, his medium and his audience, all of which con-

stitute the conscious exercise of his craft. But before it is ready for his hand, the raw material has first come from unconscious sources—the whole sequence may have been initiated by some conscious idea which then associated itself with suitable unconscious material—and it has been processed by unconscious forces (p. 104).

These contrasting attitudes are consistent with each other. Mr. Lesser's observation that it may not be feasible to develop a truly scientific esthetic of response to fiction suggests a practical difficulty or impossibility—comparable, it may be supposed, to the impossibility of man's observing the outer limits of his expanding universe. It does not imply that the response to fiction fails to obey universal laws. One or more functions of form may not be ascertainable; but they exist; and they operate under the laws of psychoeconomics. ^{/15} In a similar way the complexity that Kris speaks of may render certitude difficult or impossible, but it does not deny the actuality of universal law that certitude presupposes. The language in which Mr. Fraiberg couches his central discussion of Kris' view of artistic activity—revision, supplies, provides, patchwork, manipulation, requirements, exercise, craft, raw material, sources, processed—compares the human mind to an industrial system operating according to the laws of classical economics and physics. It implies a closed system. ^{/16} Elsewhere Mr. Fraiberg writes:

Psychoanalysis insists that there are no accidents in psychic life; everything has meaning and purpose, if only we can discover what these are (p. 102).

[Edmund] Wilson understood that emotional life follows universal laws (p. 172).

Wilson knows that psychoanalysis is a branch of biological science (p. 179).

The historical connection of Freudian psychology to romantic thought—to the preoccupation with the self, with the passions, with the dark side of human nature that characterizes romanticism—has often been remarked upon. No less noticed has been its connection to materialistic, mechanistic thought. These two currents united in the man who, as Jones describes him, was both artist and scientist, and who allowed the scientific self—the investigator, the searcher after the final truth about sexuality—to dominate the artist to a much greater degree than had Leonardo. Freud's tribute to the mystery of art and the artist expressed the artist-romanticist in him, but his uneasiness before the enigma, that "rationalistic . . . turn of mind in me," always triumphed. "The Moses" begins in mystery and ends with science, begins with art and ends with science. In a similar way most psychoanalytical writing pays tribute to the mystery of art, and then proceeds into science.

iii

Although it was suggested that the dual attitude of modesty and certitude need not reflect inconsistent assumptions, there is a possibility that it does. Do Freudian critics acknowledge that art is mysterious, free, or do they acknowledge only that it may be impenetrable, ineluctable? Do they settle, finally, for mystery or for universal law? The weight of evidence suggests the latter, and there may be no problem. But Freud's famous statement in "Dostoevsky and Parricide" comes to mind: "Before the problem of the creative artist analysis must, alas, lay down its arms." And Mr. Fraiberg speaks of "mysteries of esthetics . . . beyond the reach of psychoanalysis" (p. 28). Such statements do seem to press in the direction of mystery rather than of universal law. ^{/17}

What are the implications of subscribing to the notion of universal law—whether that law be penetrable or impenetrable? One implication is a version of relativism. It can be seen, in

part, in Freud's analysis of the statue of Moses. The statue derives its particular quality from Michelangelo's own struggle to control the violence of his temper; reaction to the statue depends upon the psyche of the individual critic. Carried further than Freud carries it, such a view implies that Freud understood the statue only in terms of his own psyche, and that other Freudian critics will necessarily contemplate the statue differently. Such a view underlies much Freudian analysis of artists and their art. It is unsatisfactory. In contemplating the statue of Moses, Freud must have stood above the law, observing others obeying the law, observing himself bowing before his father, himself, and his younger brother. He possessed the capacity of doubling, of creating a self to stand outside of the obedient self. In such a self there lurks the possibility of violation of the law. If, as Freud acknowledged, great artists have long been capable of the detached observation that he himself achieved in agony, then the door is opened — it seems — to chaos, to mystery.

The other implication of universal law commonly appears in Freudian esthetics. It is an implication that has been pursued from other vantage points. In The Mathematical Basis of the Arts Joseph Schillinger writes: "If art implies selectivity, skill and organization, ascertainable principles must underlie it. Once such principles are discovered and formulated, works of art may be produced by scientific synthesis." /18 One sees a similar end in view when Mr. Lesser remarks that narrative form serves the three functions of giving pleasure, avoiding guilt, and facilitating perception. To be sure, the mathematical theory envisages an art produced by an IBM machine, whereas the psychological one assumes that the unconscious mind of a human being must always be the source; but the notion of prescription underlies both. It is this implication that has elicited the common criticism that Freudian critics think that if a piece of literature deals with the Oedipal complex it must be great art. Mr. Lesser responds to such criticism by distinguishing between the Oedipal theme in Hamlet and in an unimportant work:

In the first place, no one could claim that the Oedipal theme is more than one component of the subject-matter of Hamlet. But the essential point is that the contribution this one theme makes to the appeal of the play has been obscured by a particularly savage form of reduction: the theme has been contracted...to...an opprobrious label.... To show the part the theme does play in our response to Hamlet, we would have to do justice to the theme in its fulness. We would have to suggest the infinite cunning with which it is orchestrated in nearly all the play's key relationships and in innumerable actions and speeches (p. 74).

Yet the implication seems to remain: if a writer will take the great theme and orchestrate it cunningly, he will have a great play. Mr. Lesser disposes of an inadequately stated objection to a common Freudian view; at the same time he appears to subscribe to the view that when the universal laws of the mind are followed in certain complex ways the result is great art. Mr. Lesser may not acknowledge that his thinking points in such a direction, and other psychoanalytic critics may not accept the implications that their scientific approach suggests. The question, then, is whether the underlying assumption of most Freudian critics is romantic rather than scientific. Is it believed that great art is inherently mysterious?

A variety of evidence indicates an answer in favor of the romantic outlook. It is evidence of a sort that Freud sometimes favored: evidence that we might normally scorn. We who are Freudians might ask ourselves how we arrived at our wisdom. Did it come from an objective, exhaustive reading of Freudian, anti-Freudian, and non-Freudian literature, or did it come through a romantic revelation? On what evidence were we convinced that we, the Trobriand Islanders, and Neanderthal Man had endured the Oed-

ipus complex? Secondly, on what basis do we accept or reject the various and often conflicting views of psychoanalysts? Psychoanalysis may be a science, just as medicine is a science; but much medicine is unscientific, and much psychoanalysis must be. /19 Consider Edmund Bergler's five-layer structure of sublimation:

The starting point in sublimation is not an id wish per se, but the result of aggression. In other words, it is in itself the result of a conflict. That conflict is presented (layer one), immediately counteracted by a superego reproach (layer two), which necessitates the establishment of a defense mechanism (layer three). The supergeo objects, however, even to the defense mechanism (layer four), which in turn forces the unconscious ego to sublimate (layer five), which represents the defense against the defense. /20

Some of us may say that criticism of such a theory lies beyond our province, and leave it to the psychoanalysts. (Yet we may have been willing to make a judgment on the Oedipus complex.) But some of us, perhaps most of us, will feel the way Kepler is said to have felt in contemplating the intricate mathematics of his time that described the movement of the stars: the art of the Creator could not have been so clumsy, so inelegant. The modern description of such movement is more complicated than it was when Kepler stepped in to simplify it; and therefore Bergler may be right. Nevertheless, one wonders whether any of the artists whom Bergler analyzed had produced a grand, overwhelming work — an unsolved riddle — such as the statue of Moses. Perhaps most of us reject Bergler's theory as being at once too complex and too simple. We are not experts in psychoanalysis; but the whole of our knowledge in every realm gives us a viewpoint from which we say as authoritatively as possible: that piece of psychoanalytic theory does not fit. The viewpoint may be a romantic one, in which the notion of fitting is itself suspect.

Consider two psychoanalytical discussions of music:

The esthetic effect of music is the result of three factors: compulsive repetition, pleasure in economy and the force of attraction exerted by the unconscious. /21

The external world of the infant is alien, dangerous. Associated with it is the chaos of external sounds, against which the infant cannot protect itself. Music is the formal control and knowledge of sounds which once threatened destruction. /22

Who will doubt that the second passage speaks more truly about the significance of the opening bars of Beethoven's Ninth Symphony? The authors of the second view quote Rilke to support their argument: "For Beauty's nothing / but beginning of Terror we're still just able to bear." Some people will doubt it. Will not their judgment, too, be an intuitive, romantic one?

A similar attitude prevails in judgments upon art itself. When Freud remarks in "The Moses" that "some of the grandest and most overwhelming creations of art are still unsolved riddles" (p. 211), he seems almost to be saying that a work of art that is a riddle is a great work; and he is unquestionably acknowledging the fact that men pass the judgment of greatness upon works which escape rational analysis. The judgment is intuitive, romantic. In the Introduction to his translation of Euripides' *The Bacchae*, William Arrowsmith writes:

Of itself *The Bacchae* needs neither apology nor general introduction. It is, clearly and flatly, that unmistakable thing, a masterpiece. . . . Elusive, complex and compelling, the play constantly recedes before one's grasp, advancing, not retreating, steadily into deeper chaos and larger order. . . . /23

The play has a disconcerting transparency. It yields to psycho-

analytic investigation its theme of homosexuality and castration, of id wish and ego control, much more readily than, say, "Death in Venice" yields its similar themes. But when one compares the two works, one sees that "Death in Venice" is a complex psychological story and that The Bacchae is clearly and flatly a riddle. Similarly one comes away in bafflement from that greater work than Hamlet, King Lear. No critic has touched its center. Even Hamlet eludes us. At one time, when the commentaries of Schlegel, Bradley, and others proved inadequate, the essay of Jones came like a revelation. But time passes, and though we still regard the essay highly, it seems less and less central. Hamlet reasserts its mystery, and we turn elsewhere for a new effort to penetrate it.

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What should Freudian criticism be? A nice balance between romanticism and science? Science unveiling the mysteries? Are we brothers to those scholars — some of whom gaze scornfully upon us — who are scientists laboring in the vineyards of the humanities? Possibly a new approach is called for: that of the scientist moving always in the direction of mystery, and content to end there. What is Freud's study of the statue of Moses? Surely we reject the notion that it is merely a reflection of his own mentality or of early twentieth century Austrian mentality. Surely we reject the notion that it is merely the last scientific word on the statue. Despite Freud's inadequate confession of humility, it is, perhaps, an approach to mystery rather than an unveiling of it; and its chief merit as a piece of analysis may be that it succeeds in conveying something of the mystery that the statue always possesses. It provides in itself a parallel to that mystery. Not being a great artwork, it presently surrenders its own mystery — expressed through its sense of revelation — and another essay must attempt to approach the statue in another way. (Some measure of Freud's achievement is suggested by the fact that Charles de Tolnay's recent analysis of the statue does little more than re-state Freud's interpretation. The study of Leonardo has not fared so well. /24) The same fate overtakes Jones' essay on Hamlet. Not many years ago the chief means of conveying the mystery of great art was enthusiastic and impressionistic commentary; it has been succeeded by a criticism that is drier, more cautious, a criticism that at its worst — while being most scientific — is dust and ashes, and that at its best succeeds in its scientific way of approaching mystery.

Mr. Fraiberg remarks in his book that Ernest Jones "believes that the more deeply the artist goes into his unconscious for inspiration . . . the more profound the result is likely to be" (pp. 61-62). No Freudian critic is likely to disagree with the opinion, but it needs elucidation. What is the difference in meaning between deep and profound? Will it do to say that the more profoundly the artist goes into his unconscious the more profound the result is likely to be? Or that the more deeply he goes the deeper the result is likely to be? The language begins with classical mechanics — with the notion of depths, with the notion of an unconscious that occupies physical space; and it ends with mystery — with a word that has lost both literal and metaphorical meaning in order to express the inexpressible. The division of the mind into id, ego, and superego is a mechanistic reduction, presumably a more valid reduction than Jung's fourfold division, but inevitably inadequate. Ultimately we must say that the more profoundly an artist thinks, the more profound the result is likely to be.

It is not to be believed that mankind merely cringes under the eternal gaze of Moses who carries the unbreakable Tables of the laws. The mass of us may cringe, but Freud was that free, mysterious man who met the gaze and broke the laws. And so is the great artist: that man whose masterpiece constantly recedes

before one's grasp, advancing, not retreating, steadily into deeper chaos and larger order.

James G. Hepburn
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notes

- 1/ The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, XIII (London, 1955), 211.
- 2/ Actually, Freud posits two prior positions, the first one of calm, the second of anger.
- 3/ Quoted by Ernest Jones, The Life and Work of Sigmund Freud, II (New York, 1955), 365n.
- 4/ Jones draws upon Freud's opening remarks in the essay on the statue for his translation.
- 5/ Freud's attempt at artistry is apparent in the passage from the essay quoted on p. 101. He published the essay anonymously, and altered some of the biographical details in it so that he would not be recognized as the author. Even if he had thought for a long time that the statue was about to start up in wrath, the time might well refer to a period prior to his seeing the actual statue in Rome.
- 6/ Surprise and the Psychoanalyst (New York, 1937), p. 29.
- 7/ Standard Edition, XI, 73. Italics added.
- 8/ Leonardo da Vinci (Cambridge, 1952). See especially the introductory note.
- 9/ The study of Leonardo was written and published in 1909-10; its immediate inspiration, according to James Strachey (Standard Edition, XI, 60-61), came in 1909. The study of the statue of Moses was written and published in 1913-14; however, its gestation, along with its main insight, goes back to 1901. Strachey remarks upon a continuing interest in the statue in the intervening years.
- 10/ Some of Freud's feelings about "The Moses" can be seen in his later anxiety over the writing and publishing of Moses and Monotheism. Compare especially in Jones' Life II, 366, and III, 192-194.
- 11/ Standard Edition, XVII, 236. Italics added.
- 12/ See II, 480-483. After I finished writing the present essay, Norman N. Holland's "Freud and the Poet's Eye," Literature and Psychology, XI, 2 (Spring 1961), 36-45, came to my attention. Mr. Holland attempts to penetrate Freud's psyche in a way comparable to my approach. In doing so, he develops further than I Jones' notion of Freud's ambivalence towards artists. Since I express reservations about such analysis, our conclusions differ.
- 13/ Boston, 1957, pp. 14, 46, 125.
- 14/ Detroit, 1960, p. 91.
- 15/ See Otto Fenichel, The Psychoanalytic Theory of Neurosis, (New York, 1945), pp. 12-14, for an indication of the importance of psychoeconomics to the basis of psychoanalytic theory.
- 16/ According to Fraiberg, Kris sees psychoanalysis as an "open system" (p. 91). As used, though, the term suggests only an incomplete system.
- 17/ In his recent article, "New Views of Art and the Creative Process in Psychoanalytic Ego Psychology," Literature and Psychology, XI, 2 (Spring 1961), pp. 45-55, Mr. Fraiberg writes, "The mystery of creativity is still a mystery, but new light is being

shed into some of its dark corners" (p. 46).

18/ New York, 1948, p. 3.

19/ See Fraiberg, p. 239, for a defense of psychoanalysis and medicine as sciences. For an unfavorable psychoanalytical comment on the science of medicine, see Gregory Zilboorg, Mind, Medicine, and Man (New York, 1943), pp. 151-153, on electric shock therapy.

20/ "On a Five-Layer Structure in Sublimation," Psychoanalytic Quarterly, XIV (1945), 81-82.

21/ Isador H. Coriat, "Some Aspects of a Psychoanalytic Interpretation of Music," Psychoanalytic Review, XXXII (1945), 408.

22/ Heinz Kohut and Siegmund Levarie, "On the Enjoyment of Listening to Music," Psychoanalytic Quarterly, XIX (1950), 64-87; a summary of their views.

23/ Euripides · V (Chicago, 1959), p. 142.

24/ Charles de Tolnay, The Tomb of Julius II (Princeton, 1954), pp. 39-42.

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(Relevant) books received:

% - Leonard F. Dean, editor — A Casebook on Othello (New York: Crowell, 1961). Pp. viii + 269 (with Suggestions for Study, Discussion, and Writing; no index). Paperback: \$2.50. [The "%" is based mainly on the Kirschbaum essay and, to some extent, on Heilman's. This book, together with the Rosenberg work listed below, will form the basis of what we hope will be a symposium on Othello in an early 1962 issue.]

% - Marvin Rosenberg — The Masks of Othello: The Search for Identity of Othello, Iago, and Desdemona by Three Centuries of Actors and Critics (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1961). Pp. ix + 313 (with Notes and Index). \$5.00. [Chapter 13 in Part V ("Othello and the Critics") is a revised version of "In Defense of Iago," which we noted in V, 3, 52.]

& - Charles L. Sanford — The Quest for Paradise: Europe and the American Moral Imagination (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1961). Pp. xi + 282 (including Index). \$5.00. [This new study of "the myth of Eden" certainly calls for more use of Freud than the single reference on page 3 to the influence of Beyond the Pleasure Principle on Santayana's "A Long Way Round to Nirvana." Perhaps some volunteer will undertake to assess the entire approach of the author in terms of psychodynamic principles.]

& - Jack Stillinger, editor — The Early Draft of John Stuart Mill's Autobiography (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1961). Pp. 218 (including Index). \$5.50. [In the Editor's Introduction there are references to A. W. Levi's "The 'Mental Crisis' of John Stuart Mill," Psychoanalytic Rev., XXXII (1945), 86-101, and "The Writing of Mill's Autobiography," Ethics, LXI (1951), 284-296, as well as to Lewis Samuel Feuer's Psychoanalysis and Ethics — Springfield, Ill., 1955 — pp. 55-60. There is a somewhat disconcerting entry in the Index, in which Mill's reading in Locke and Hartley is referred to under the heading "Psychology, analytic." Has there ever been a full-scale psychodynamic study of Mill?]

Offprints received:

% - William H. Marshall, "The Self, the World, and the Structure of Jane Eyre," Rev des Langues Vivantes (Vol & No not given, but recent), pp. 416-425. [Professor Marshall aptly calls the paper "a peculiar blend of Freud and Calvin." His footnotes contain a number of references which we should like to notice more fully at a later time. We wish that he had not used the term "psychographers" to refer to the critics who follow the critical

approach of Wayne Burns, for example. We admit being plagued by the difficulty of finding a word to designate this critical approach, but we would rather leave "psychographer" to the followers of Gamaliel Bradford, who first pre-empted the word.]

& - Albert J. Lubell, "Matthew Arnold: Between Two Worlds," MLQ, 22, 3 (Sep 1961), 248-263. [The author uses the unpublished Diaries for the years 1845 through 1847 as a source for tracing literary and philosophical influences during these critical years; we feel that they might also be used as additional sources for the comprehension of psychological conflicts.]

& - Marshall Van Deusen — A Metaphor for the History of American Literary Criticism (Uppsala and Copenhagen: Essays and Studies on American Language and Literature, No. 13, 1961). Pp. 62. [It is something of a feat to summarize the course of American literary criticism — admittedly from secondary sources — without saying anything about the impact of psychology except to report that Allen Tate "also attacked psychological criticism like I. A. Richards' for conceiving of literature as a kind of therapy for regulating nervous states . . . (p. 50)."]

& - Frederick R. Karl, "Beauchamp's Career: An English Ordeal," 19 C-Fict, Sep 1961, 117-131.

From psychoanalytic journals:

* - Eugene Goodheart, "Freud and Lawrence," Psa & Psa Rev, 47, 4 (Win 1960-61), 56-64.

& - Reuben Fine, rev of Philip Rieff — Freud: The Mind of the Moralist (New York: Viking Press, 1959), Ibid, 121-124.

& - Norman Cohn, "The Cult of the Free Spirit: A Medieval Heresy Reconstructed," Ibid, 48, 1 (Spr 1961), 51-68.

* - Dorothy F. Zeligs, "Solomon: Man and Myth," Ibid, Part I in 48, 1 (Spr 1961), 77-103, Part II in 48, 2 (Sum 1961), 91-110.

* - Isabella Black, "Was It [Thomas] Arnold's Doing? A Psychological Study of Arthur Hugh Clough," Ibid, 48, 1 (Spr 1961), 104-110.

* - Margaret St. Clair, "A Note on the Guilt of Oedipus," Ibid, 111-114. [Cf. "Dream at Thebes," Lit & Psy, XI, 1, 12-19.]

* - Edward O. Tabor, rev of Immanuel Velikovsky — Oedipus and Akhnaton, Myth and History (Garden City: Doubleday, 1960), Ibid, 123-125.

* - Milton Gold, "Freud's Views on Art," Ibid (Sum 1961), 111-114. [A 1940 version of a Trilling paper appears in the notes; there is no other reference to any literary criticism, not even to Fraiberg, whose paper on Freud and Art should have been used by Dr. Gold, at least as it appeared in Int Jrnl Psa.]

& - Arthur Koestler, "The Pressures of the Past," Ibid, 48, 3 (Fall 1961), 25-40. [A chapter from The Lotus and the Robot, dealing with India, particularly with Gandhi.]

* - Melvin W. Askew, "Catharsis and Modern Tragedy," Ibid, 81-96.

& - C. H. Patterson, "The Self in Rogerian Theory," Jrnl Ind Psy, 17, 1 (May 1961), 5-11. [Anyone interested in recent developments in depth psychology is sure to find increasing reference to the theory and practice of C. R. Rogers. This brief paper may serve as a useful introduction for the non-specialist.]

& - Rowena R. Ansbacher, rev of Lancelot Law Whyte — The Unconscious Before Freud (New York: Basic Books, 1960), Ibid, 113-117.